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State Takeover Statutes Revisitedt 
Richard A. Booth* 
I have a confession to make. The title of my article that appeared 
recently in this review, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 1 was 
deliberately chosen for its shock value. Since few if any reflective 
works have supported state takeover statutes, 2 it occurred to me that a 
title suggesting there was something positive in them might get some-
one's attention. Clearly it did. In a recent piece entitled Missing the 
Point About State Takeover Statutes, 3 Professors Lyman Johnson and 
David Millon take issue with my title. I say that they take issue with 
my title because it does not appear that they read the article itself. 
Johnson and Millon have two complaints. First, they point out 
that partial and two-tier tender offers are far less common today than 
are tender offers for all of a target company's outstanding common 
shares.4 The suggestion is that my analysis of state takeover statutes 
in general and control share acquisition statutes in particular is irrele-
vant. They neglect to note that I acknowledged the decline of coercive 
offers.5 
Second, Johnson and Millon complain that my analysis proceeds 
from the assumption that shareholder welfare ought to be the standard 
by which we judge the wisdom of corporation laws. 6 They neglect to 
note that I acknowledged the broader issue of whether other constitu-
encies such as employees, suppliers, customers, or bondholders are 
harmed by takeovers and explained that, even if they are, the question 
remains whether the mechanisms by which takeover bidders buy con-
trol is fair to shareholders. 7 
t © 1989 by Richard A. Booth. 
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1. Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1635 (1988). 
2. Indeed, I have not found any that unequivocally qualify for this honor, though Professor 
Bebchuk has noted that control share statutes are similar in important respects to the tender offer 
mechanism he has advocated. Bebchuk, The Sole Owner Standard for Takeover Policy, 17 J, 
LEGAL STUDIES 197, 222-23 (1988). 
3. Johnson & Millon, Missing the Point About State Takeover Statutes, 81 MICH. L. REV. 846 
(1989). 
4. Id. at 846-47. 
5. Booth, supra note 1, at 1651 n.46. 
6. Johnson & Millon, supra note 3, at 847-57. 
7. Booth, supra note 1, at 1659-61, 1668-69. 
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As for the first complaint, Johnson and Millon are of the opinion 
that too much has been written about the nearly extinct coercive 
tender offer. To some extent, I would agree with that sentiment. But 
given my conclusion that the problem of coercion was illusory, 8 it 
should have been apparent that my analysis of state takeover statutes 
was likely to proceed differently from earlier works that saw coercion 
as a problem.9 The reason I addressed coercive offers was because 
there was evidence that when they were used premiums were demon-
strably lower. 10 Thus whether coercive offers continue to be used 
widely is quite beside the point. 
Nevertheless, I am not so sure that coercive offers are dead. They 
could just be hiding. It may be that defensive tactics such as fair price 
amendments and poison pills and now state takeover statutes (which 
are really nothing more than the same defenses statutorily standard-
ized) 11 are the reason that two-tier offers have been forsaken (if indeed 
they have been). If so, it makes sense to take a hard look at which 
mechanism for their elimination works best. 12 In other words, state 
takeover statutes should not necessarily be viewed as an additional 
layer of defense. It may well be that a state's official adoption of a 
defense will be interpreted by the courts as a condemnation of other 
nonstandardized tactics. 13 
Moreover, while coercive offers may be less common than they 
once were, they still are used. In the six-month period ending March 
12, 1989, there were sixty-eight third-party tender offers announced in 
the Wall Street Journal, of which sixteen were partial or two-tier 
bids. 14 These included friendly offers, hostile offers, and buyout offers. 
Indeed, it has been noted elsewhere that coercive bids are still fre-
quently used in connection with management buyouts. 15 Admittedly, 
state takeover statutes will not ordinarily affect a management 
buyout. 16 But that is beside the point. Maybe they should. It is every 
8. See, e.g., id. at 1655. 
9. Id. at 1636. 
10. Id. at 1643-59. 
11. See id. at 1679-80. 
12. Id. at 1668-69. 
13. See id. at 1678 n.161. 
14. A summary of my study is on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
15. Grundfest, Two-Tier Bids Are Now a Defensive Technique, Natl. L.J., Nov. 9, 1987, at 26, 
col. 1. 
16. Management proposing a buyout will ordinarily have the right to vote by virtue of earlier 
approval by the shareholders, and thus will be able to vote in connection with the buyout unless 
additional shares are acquired outright or other shareholders join with management in the propo-
sal such that the percentage of votes owned or controlled exceeds a new threshold. See, e.g., IND. 
CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to -9 (West 1989). 
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bit as possible (indeed more so) for management as for outsiders to 
coerce shareholders into tendering in connection with a buyout. 17 The 
tests and procedures that are implicit in state takeover statutes could 
well be extended to buyouts. 18 To be sure, Delaware has, as a matter 
of case law, effectively imposed a voting scheme on all mergers that is 
the substantial equivalent of a control share statute, at least from the 
point of view of incumbent management. 19 Under Delaware case law, 
management must submit any proposal for a merger in which it has a 
conflicting interest-as in a cashout merger-to a vote of the disinter-
ested shareholders (in addition to the statutorily required vote of all 
the shareholders) in order to enjoy the presumption that the merger 
price is fair. In short, the voting scheme imposed under control share 
statutes is amenable to broader application and has, in fact, found 
broader application. 
In addition to buyouts, there are other transactions related to cor-
porate control that are tinged with the same problems of coercion as 
those associated with partial and two-tier offers which could well ben-
efit from a broadly applicable scheme of shareholder approval such as 
the one embodied in the revised control share statute that I propose. 
For one, recapitalizations, though they are now the subject of an elab-
orate Securities and Exchange Commission rule20 and, like buyouts, 
are not addressed by state takeover statutes, were frequently carried 
out (before the new rule) by means of a supposedly voluntary ex-
change offer that in form is very like a coercive bid.21 (Indeed, the fact 
that recapitalizations often so proceeded strongly suggests that coer-
cive tactics would still be freely used if they had not been eliminated 
first by shark repellent amendments, then by poison pills, and now by 
state takeover statutes.) For another, greenmail is arguably the same 
thing as a partial bid in which the bidder is bribed to go away.22 In-
deed, it might well be that the recent decline in hostile coercive bids is 
roughly offset by a more frequent incidence of the open market assem-
blage of a threatening block of stock in the absence of a formal tender 
17. See Grundfest, supra note 15. 
18. See Booth, Management Buyouts, Shareholder Welfare, and the Limits of Fiduciary Duty, 
60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630 {1985). 
19. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
20. Exchange Act Rule 19c-4, 53 Fed. Reg. 26,394 (1988) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 
§ 240.19c-4). See generally Voting Rights Listing Standards - Disenfranchisement Rule, Ex-
change Act Release No. 25,891, [1987-1988 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 84,247 
(July 7, 1988). 
21. See Gilson, Evaluating Dual Class Common Stock: The Relevance of Substitutes, 13 VA. 
L. REV. 807 (1987). 
22. See Booth, The Problem with Federal Tender Offer Law, 11 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming 
1989). 
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offer. Interestingly enough, new and powerful techniques such as the 
"street sweep,"23 by which large blocks of stock can be assembled 
without ever declaring a tender offer, have been invented more or less 
simultaneously with the decline of the coercive offer. Could it be, be-
tween the invention of new takeover techniques and management be-
coming more alert to serious threats to its control (as well as more 
exposed to suit for failure to accept an attractive bid24), that the coer-
cion problem still exists as strongly as ever (or even more so) but is 
hardly ever played out so late in the game as to arise in connection 
with a tender offer itself? 
That brings me to the real reason for the title of my article. The 
promise of state takeover statutes may lie primarily in the regulation 
of transactions other than takeovers. As I point out in the article, 
control share statutes have apparently inadvertently suggested solu-
tions to other vexing problems of corporation law. For one thing, they 
may eliminate greenmail: no one can accumulate stock and threaten a 
takeover solely for the purpose of exacting a bribe that injures remain-
ing shareholders if the remaining shareholders have the ability to 
block the greenmailer's ultimate accession to power. 25 Control share 
statutes may also preclude sales of control by controlling shareholders 
without disinterested shareholder approval. 26 Indeed, in a pending 
Ohio case (with which I have had some involvement), a bidder has 
argued that target management's efforts to shore up control by con-
verting non-voting preferred stock and debentures into common stock 
so as to increase its voting power from 17% to 47% violates the Ohio 
control share statute which requires an advance shareholder vote on 
any acquisition raising a shareholder's ownership over the one-fifth or 
one-third threshhold.27 In other words, the Ohio statute arguably reg-
ulates any number of defensive tactics that operate by placing addi-
tional votes in friendly hands (including lockups, poison pills, and 
recapitalizations). Needless to say, these possibly salutary effects of 
control share statutes may be modified or eliminated if incumbent 
management reserves the power to approve a deal without a share-
23. See generally Acquisitions of Substantial Amounts of Securities and Related Activities 
Undertaken During and Following a Tender Offer for Those Securities, Exchange Act Release 
No. 24,976, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 11 84,160 (Oct. 1, 1987). 
24. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986); 
Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 
488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
25. See Booth, supra note 1, at 1685-87. 
26. See id. at 1690-91. 
27. Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint, Granada Investments v. DWG Corp., No. 
1:89CV0641 (N.D. Ohio 1989). 
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holder vote (as is typically the case in connection with a nonstatutory 
poison pill). 28 But that too is quite beside the point. The point is that 
the central idea of a shareholder vote to determine whether control 
prerogatives may be exercised by an existing or potential controlling 
shareholder is promising. 
Ironically, a well-conceived control share statute probably will do 
little to stop the takeover of a company ripe for it, even though there is 
little doubt that the true motivation for state takeover laws has been 
the desire of state legislators to prevent the takeover of resident com-
panies. 29 The reason, of course, is that shareholders like takeovers and 
will likely vote in favor of an attractive offer. Thus it should not be 
surprising that the statutes of most states, as they currently appear on 
the books, include any number of procedural devices intended to favor 
target management. 30 As I pointed out, Indiana itself, in a veritable 
legislative frenzy, adopted three other forms of takeover statutes in 
combination with the control share statute upheld by the Supreme 
Court.31 
In short, the ultimate point of my article is not, as Johnson and 
Millon seem to think, to demonstrate that we are in fact better off 
because of the adoption of state takeover statutes. Rather, my point is 
precisely the one suggested by the title, namely, that control share 
statutes could have a good deal of merit if appropriately reworked. In 
other words, :my point is much like the point often made about vicari-
ous liability of "masters" for the torts of their "servants": it no doubt 
is a vestige of feudal times and was based on a view of relationships 
that is no longer valid, but, as it turns out, there are powerful eco-
nomic arguments that justify its retention. 32 Control share statutes 
28. See, e.g., Moran v. Household Intl., Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
29. See Booth, supra note l, at 1668-70. 
30. As I have pointed out, the requirement that a bidder be enfranchised in as many as three 
separate votes is otherwise difficult to justify. Id. at 1699. 
Johnson and Millon also think I may have misread the Indiana statute as regards the ability 
of tendering shareholders to vote on whether to enfranchise a bidder. They point out that the 
bidder will not ordinarily have purchased tendered shares by the time the record date for the vote 
has been set. Johnson & Millon, supra note 3, at 852 n.21. They ignore the fact that (at least 
before the advent of control share statutes) ordinarily a bidder would seek and obtain a proxy in 
connection with the tender of shares. No doubt a tactic under a control share regime will be to 
refrain from soliciting a proxy in order to allow tendering shareholders to vote in favor of the 
offer as they no doubt would. Whether tendering shareholders are allowed to vote under the 
Indiana statute is, however, unclear. Certainly it is contrary to the spirit of the statute; and it is 
quite arguable, even as the statute currently reads, that tendered shares should be grouped with 
interested shares for purposes of a control share vote. If not, it is a defect that could easily be 
fixed. In any event, the point is a mere technicality and does not detract in the least from the 
broader arguments in favor of control share statutes. As I have noted and renoted, the Indiana 
act is far from perfect as it stands and could do with major reworking in many respects. 
31. Booth, supra note 1, at 1681. 
32. See, e.g., Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE 
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may well be a similarly serendipitous development. 
The second complaint that Johnson and Millon have with my arti-
cle is essentially that I did not write a different article. As they see it, 
too little thought has been given to the fact that state takeover statutes 
are designed to impede takeovers. The implication is that states have 
abandoned shareholder welfare as the standard in connection with 
corporation law and now seek to protect other constituencies. 33 
In recent months, there has been a flurry of propaganda extolling 
the responsibility of public corporations to their "stakeholders," de-
fined by one proponent as a company's shareholders, customers, sup-
pliers, employees, and community.34 The idea seems to derive from 
the fairly orthodox notion that a firm is a "nexus of contracts," a pos-
sibly fleeting meeting of efficiencies that results in the establishment of 
an organization, the firm, rather than leaving the various parties to 
rely on open market transactions to accomplish their ends. 35 The 
stakeholder concept pretty much neglects further analysis of this in-
sight and jumps to the conclusion that since a firm is a collection of 
relationships, more and less formal, it should not be so easy for it to be 
dismantled by unscrupulous corporate raiders who pander to the 
greed of fickle shareholders. 
The idea is not without merit. Consider a hypothetical break-even 
company that is making no money for its shareholders, has no pros-
pects of ever making any money for its shareholders, and has no assets 
that are capable of being sold off or put to any more profitable use. 
Does such a company have any value? Clearly the company has no 
value to its shareholders. Nevertheless, it does continue to consume 
goods and services and pay some sorts of taxes. Thus the company 
has value to its suppliers, employees, and community. Of course, such 
a company is in no real danger of being taken over. But suppose now 
L.J. 499 (1961); Douglas, Vicarious Liability and the Administration of Risk (pts. 1 & 2), 38 
YALE L.J. 584, 720 (1929); Holmes, Agency (pts. 1 & 2), 4 HARV. L. REV. 345 (1891), 5 HARV. 
L. REV. 1 (1891); Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and Per-
sonal Liability for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1345 (1982); Laski, The Basis of Vicarious Liabil-
ity, 26 YALE L.J. 105 (1916); Morris, The Torts of an Independent Contractor, 29 ILL. L. REV. 
339 (1934); Smith, Frolic and Detour (pts. 1 & 2), 23 COLUM. L. REV. 444, 716 (1923); Sykes, 
The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule 
and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563 (1988); Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious 
Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231 (1984); Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts: Its History (pt. 
2), 7 HARV. L. REV. 383 (1894). 
33. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 3, at 847-54. 
34. See Boland, Shareholders vs. 'Stakeholders,' Wall St. J., Feb. 10, 1988, at 20, col. 3; see 
also Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1 
(1987). 
35. See Coffee, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, 85 MICH. 
L. REV. 1, 99-100 (1986). 
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that the company can be put to a more profitable use by dismantling 
its plant and equipment and reassembling the whole thing in Tasma-
nia. The shareholders would presumably sell out for even a minimal 
payment. The question becomes whether the gain to the shareholders 
exceeds the loss to the other "stakeholders." 
There is a genuine question whether claimants who cannot diver-
sify their investments should be entitled to some protection.36 The 
usual response has been that every claimant senior to the shareholders 
- which is every other claimant - should be left to private contrac-
tual remedies. It is quite clear, however, that an undiversified claim-
ant takes greater risk and that the return enjoyed is thus worth less, 
dollar for dollar, than the return enjoyed by a diversified claimant. 
Ordinarily, of course, shareholders assume (and prefer) greater risk 
than senior claimants because they are paid only out of residual return 
which, by definition, fluctuates. Senior claimants in theory bear no 
srich volatility risk. They bear only default risk. But it seems at least 
conceivable that sometimes shareholders will be able to diversify away 
enough risk that senior claimants are left with more overall risk than 
equity investors. 
There is some tension here, too, with the way we view managers. 
One model that has been somewhat discredited with the recent trend 
toward "deconglomeration"37 is the idea that the talented manager 
can run any firm no matter what it makes or does. The other model, 
of course, counsels the manager to stick to his or her last and not to 
stray too far from the business which he or she knows.38 If a man-
ager's "human capital" can be put to many uses, then the takeover of 
the firm is primarily a reflection of the job the manager has done. If, 
on the other hand, the manager is more or less dedicated to a line of 
business, then the takeover of the firm may have more to do with the 
view of a well-financed outsider that the business itself is obsolete 
(which, of course, it may be). 
Interestingly, financial creditors never seem to be mentioned as 
stakeholders. Could it be that the only stakeholders who have been 
targeted in this campaign to project responsibility are those who have 
relatively little bargaining power and are being exploited by the stake 
itself? And if so, to whom does the benefit of these attractive relation-
ships, namely higher than ordinary returns, belong?39 
36. Id. at 16-24. 
37. Id. at 31-35. 
38. See Hayes & Abernathy, Managing Our Way to Economic Decline, HARV. Bus. REV., 
July-Aug. 1980, at 67. 
39. Coincidentally, there has been increasing attention in the legal literature to fraudulent 
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Politically, nonshareholder constituencies may do better in the 
psychological battle over takeover policy than shareholders, precisely 
because shareholders are diversified and other constituencies tend not 
to be and indeed usually cannot be.40 In the end, it is just this discrep-
ancy that has worried most commentators on state corporation stat-
utes. That is, the worry has been that political forces are behind 
statutes designed to impede the market for_ corporate control for the 
benefit of constituencies other than the shareholders.41 
Thus the central question is whether the shareholders who are the 
big winners are enjoying the premiums they do because bidders with 
better ideas are willing to share the wealth (which is fine), or whether 
premiums sometimes (or even often) are paid out of savings expected 
to be generated by the acquirer's reneging on contracts with managers, 
suppliers, customers, or employees (which may not be fine). 
Corporation law provides no unequivocal answers here. Consider 
the following scenario. An able manager approaches the stockholders 
of a company that is just breaking even under current management. 
The prospective manager claims that the company can be run in such 
a way that it will be worth $10 million, but in exchange for turning the 
company around, the manager insists on $5 million. As an indication 
of good faith, the manager agrees to be paid only if the company's 
performance in fact improves. For one reason or another the share-
holders are persuaded and agree to the deal. The manager takes 
charge and after a time it becomes apparent that indeed the company 
will increase in value. However, an outsider somehow discovers that 
the fortunes of the company are about to improve and learns of the 
deal with the current manager. The outsider proposes to buy the 
shareholders' shares for an aggregate payment of $9 million. The 
conveyance issues in connection with tender offer defenses and leveraged buyouts. See, e.g., 
Kirby, McGuinness & Kandel, Fraudulent Conveyance Concerns in Leveraged Buyout Lending, 
43 Bus. LAW. 27 (1987); Murdoch, Sartin & Zadek, Leveraged Buyouts and Fraudulent Trans-
fers: Life After Gleneagles, 43 Bus. LAW. 1 (1987); Note, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and 
Leveraged Buyouts, 87 CoLUM. L. REV. 1491 (1987). 
40. See Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 120-22, 
134-36, 187-~8 (1987); Note, Securities Law and the Constitution: State Tender Offer Statutes 
Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510 (1979). There are some notable possible exceptions. For exam-
ple, large-scale suppliers and customers might prefer a freer market for corporate control on the 
theory that stronger demand or oversupply will be generated and that the benefits of such compe-
tition will outweigh the cost of any disruption in particular contracts. 
41. See Coffee, supra note 35; Langevoort, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Corporate 
Takeovers: A Comment on CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 101 HARV. L. REV. 96 
(1987); Levmore, Interstate Exploitation and Judicial Intervention, 69 VA. L. REV. 563 (1983); 
Romano, supra note 40; Warren, Developments in State Takeover Regulation: Mite and Its Af-
termath, 40 Bus. LAW. 671 (1985); Note, The Constitutionality of Second Generation Takeover 
Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 203 (1987); Note, supra note 40; Note, The Tender Offer Regulation 
Battle Continues: Should States Regulate Only Local Companies? 60 IND. L.J. 721 (1985). 
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shareholders, of course, sell. The new owner fires the incumbent man-
ager, who has neglected to provide adequately for such a contingency 
in connection with the $5-million compensation arrangement. The 
new owner thereby escapes having to pay the old manager and keeps 
the $1 million difference. 
Should the manager in such circumstances be free to defend 
against the bidder or should the manager's duty to the shareholders 
override the contract that the manager made with the company? The 
manager, of course, has a duty first to the company. That duty pre-
sumably comprehends a responsibility to see to it that the company 
lives up to contracts into which it has entered. But the company has a 
contract with the manager. It would seem that the manager's duty to 
the company allows the manager, in appropriate circumstances, to 
take actions that are also intended to benefit the manager. Similar, 
indeed stronger, arguments can be made for the other constituencies. 
The question is ultimately the same one that arose in the epic bat-
tle between Texaco and Pennzoil.42 Which will prevail: contract or 
fiduciary duty? The answer that is most frequently given is that man-
agers and other constituents, whose interest is limited to a more or less 
fixed senior return, are free to negotiate contracts that will protect 
them from raiders.43 It is unclear what the response of corporation 
law will ultimately be. Some states, including Ohio, have taken steps 
to expand fiduciary duty to include such other interests. 44 Other 
states, notably Texas, have arguably strengthened the contracts that 
are formed in such contexts.45 Still other states, such as Delaware, 
have taken steps to allow individual companies to adopt their own 
definitions of a director's duty.46 To set up boards of directors as· 
"agents" of more than one constituency and thus to compromise the 
time-tested notion that a fiduciary can serve only one master strikes 
me as unwise.47 On the other hand, it is not at all clear that these 
other constituencies can always predict as well as diversified stock-
holders (including repeat-performing takeover bidders) the dangers 
that they may face in connection with the long- term contracts they 
may desire to make with the companies they serve or with whom they 
42. See Mnookin & Wilson, Rational Bargaining and Market Efficiency: Understanding 
Pennzoil v. Texaco, 75 VA. L. REV. 295 (1989). 
43. See Coffee, supra note 35; see also Johnson & Siegel, Corporate Mergers: Redefining tlte 
Role of Target Managers, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 315 (1987). 
44. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson Supp. 1988). 
45. See Mnookin & Wilson, supra note 42. 
46. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(l) (1983). 
47. See Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928). 
October 1989] Correspondence 129 
do business. 48 
Against all this is the simple fact that we have enjoyed a remarka-
bly sustained bull market since 1982 with one notable break which 
seems to have had little effect on 'the market for corporate control.49 
This run-up has been fueled at least in part by takeover activity (or at 
the very least has been undampened by it). And most if not all of the 
real innovations in corporation law have occurred simultaneously with 
this takeover activity. The suspicion has to be that we are doing some-
thing right. 
Regrettably, Johnson and Millon have allowed their politics to 
block their view of what I was trying to say. I do not think I agree 
with their politics (though they seem to waiver a bit).50 But that is 
beside the point. It was not really my idea to take sides in the fray 
over state takeover statutes. The idea was to investigate the coercion 
claim and to suggest that there might be hidden benefits in control 
share statutes. On the other hand, perhaps my role was rather like 
that of the nuclear scientist who, in the pursuit of pure science, un-
leashed the atomic bomb. 
Johnson and Millon say that there is nothing mysterious going on 
in connection with the adoption of takeover statutes.51 I really must 
take issue with that. I agree that state takeover statutes have been 
prompted by a desire to avoid takeovers and that the explicit or im-
plicit justification of shareholder welfare is only a guise. What John-
son and Millon fail to see, however, is the possibility that corporation 
law may exacerbate the problem by creating (or failing to cure) imbal-
ances in shareholder power that result in more takeovers than might 
otherwise arise. Their disdain for coercion or quasi-coercion as a sub-
ject worthy of study does a great disservice. Again, I do not disagree 
that the possibly legitimate interests of other constituencies should be 
investigated. I just think we can do more than one thing at a time. 
48. CJ Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, supra note 32, at 1253-54 (discussing 
increased availability of monitoring devices in multi-period agencies). 
49. See Burrough, Companies Take Over the Takeover Game From Flashy Raiders, Wall St. 
J., Jan. 25, 1988, at l, col. 6; Wallace, Arbitragers Return to the Game, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 
1988, at 37, col. 2; Wayne, Business World Awhirl Again As the Big Deals Come Back. N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 19, 1988, at Al, col. I; Takeovers Are on the Rise Again, Natl. L.J., Feb. 1, 1988, at 
I, col. 3. 
50. The tone of their piece suggests that they are skeptical of and, at the same time, sympa-
thetic to the interests of non-investor constituencies. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 3, at 847-
57; see also Johnson & Millon, Misreading the Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862 (1989); 
Johnson & Millon, Does the Williams Act preempt State Common Law in Hostile Takeovers?, 16 
SEC. REG. L.J. 339 (1989) (both suggesting that the argument that federal tender offer law 
preempts state law is broader than generally recognized and questioning argument itself). 
51. Id. at 848. 
